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Abstract
The Tularosa study was designed to understand
how defensive deception–including both cyber and
psychological–affects cyber attackers. Over 130 red
teamers participated in a network penetration task over
two days in which we controlled both the presence of
and explicit mention of deceptive defensive techniques.
To our knowledge, this represents the largest study of
its kind ever conducted on a professional red team
population. The design was conducted with a battery
of questionnaires (e.g., experience, personality, etc.) and
cognitive tasks (e.g., fluid intelligence, working memory,
etc.), allowing for the characterization of a “typical”
red teamer, as well as physiological measures (e.g.,
galvanic skin response, heart rate, etc.) to be correlated
with the cyber events. This paper focuses on the design,
implementation, data, population characteristics, and
begins to examine preliminary results.

1.

Introduction

Deception is the provision of misinformation that is
realistic enough to confuse situational awareness and
to influence and misdirect perceptions and decision
processes. Deception-based cybersecurity techniques
offer potential advantages over traditional security
controls, and computer networks are natural settings for
inducing confusion due to their inherent complexity and
the uncertainty in accessing and understanding them
remotely. Though offense has traditionally had the upper
hand in the cyber realm, cyber deception is an emerging
area of research aimed at rebalancing this asymmetric
nature of cyber defense [1, 2].
Cyber deception is potentially a powerful defensive
tactic because instead of just affecting an attacker’s
behavior (by temporarily blocking access), it also
affects their decision-making processes, causing them
to waste time and effort based on incorrect information.
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However, there is little experimental evidence of how
effective this kind of defense can be or how it
may compare to other defenses. In order to measure
the (positive) impact on cyber defenders and the
(negative) impact on cyber attackers, we must use
interdisciplinary research teams that combine cyber
security with behavioral science experts. This paper
discusses the rigorous experimental design and protocol
we used and the data we collected in the Tularosa study.
We discuss preliminary results addressing one of our
research hypotheses and our plan for future data analysis
to address the remaining.
We designed a network penetration testing exercise
on a simulated computer network with different
conditions examining how the effect changes if a cyber
deception technique is used or not and whether the
participant is aware of the deception or not. We also
sought to understand the attackers’ cognitive, emotional,
and physiological responses to the deception, which is
the human subjects research (HSR) portion of the study.
This information was collected to better understand
when deception is effective and better correlate the
impact on the human (i.e., stress, confusion, frustration)
with cyber task performance.
The research study design used a range of
personality indices, physiological measures, and
cognitive tests to understand attackers’ mental models,
decisions, and behaviors. Each index, measure, and test
was hypothesized to correlate with performance on the
network penetration task in the presence of deceptive
defenses. However, while prior work has conducted
qualitative interviews with individuals who engage
in red team activities [3] and others have suggested
cognitive processes that may predict success in network
penetration attempts [4], these previous research efforts
stopped short of collecting data in order to obtain an
objective characterization of cognitive abilities and
personality attributes. This can limit our ability to
predict the effectiveness of proposed defenses and to
identify and utilize opportunities to thwart attacks. In
many cases, our cognitive tests do not correspond to
information that is directly available about attackers on
an individual basis in a real-world setting. However,
understanding the correlations between these factors
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and task performance may allow us to categorize
attackers and mount a tailored response.

2.

Related Work

One common deception technique is the use of
honeypots to lure, contain, and observe attackers
and their activities [5]. This technique has been
explored and expanded upon in many ways. There
are technologies that present an adversary with a
false network topology [6]. Others [7] have created a
framework for deception to assist in the analysis of
deceptions, whether it involves people or computers,
networks of people or computers, or people paired
with computers. Honeypot effectiveness has been tested
using cyber security games, revealing how different
setups may cause attackers to change their operations
to avoid negative outcomes [8]. Based on the success of
honeypots, fake honeypots were developed to make real
systems look fake to deter attacks [9].
Decoy systems similarly use deception techniques
but differ from honeypot technology [10]. Decoy
systems are typically embedded within the true network,
can be configured to make homogenous networks look
more heterogeneous, and are low-fidelity, requiring less
maintenance than full honeypots [11]. The main purpose
of decoys is to obfuscate the network and confuse the
attacker about the true network topology.
To date, little work has been done to rigorously
prove the efficacy of decoy systems. Few experiments
have been executed, and none of these have had
rigorous experimental control and/or a large enough
sample size of participants that generalize to the desired
population. Participants in studies with larger participant
pools typically either use unknown parties from the
internet [12, 13, 14] or students from universities
pursuing cyber-related degrees [9, 15]. Neither of these
participant pools generalizes well for predictive results
of sophisticated cyber attackers. Placing deception on
internet-facing network nodes does attain adversarial
activity, but it is uncontrolled, uncertain, and does
not allow for insight into the participants by way
of reports or interviews. Students lack the experience
and mindsets that would parallel the sophisticated
adversaries these defenses are employed to deceive. In
our study, we look to address these issues by utilizing the
closest analogous group to malicious cyber adversaries
available for scientific testing–red teams–and bringing
in a large enough number of them to guarantee the
proper statistical power and reliability to detect effects.

3.

Design

Subjects participated in a network penetration
task. Modeled after the pilot studies in [11], cyber
deception (decoy system present vs. decoy system
absent) and explicit mention of deception (informed
vs. not informed) were modified between participants

on the first day of testing. They were also controlled
within participants between the first and second days
of testing. Figure 1 contains further details on these
conditions. Participants were pseudo-randomly assigned
to one of the four conditions. Participants were run in
cohorts of varying numbers with all members of a given
cohort assigned to the same condition when possible,
but some cohorts had mixed conditions in order to
achieve a balanced number of participants between
conditions. In addition, participants completed a series
of questionnaires and cognitive tasks (see Section 3.2).

3.1.

Cyber Range

The Cyber Range was designed to emulate a
semi-realistic enterprise network. Each participant’s
environment was also instrumented so that data could
be collected during the study yet not be intrusive for
the participants. The simulated enterprise environment
consisted of a number of servers and workstations
running both Microsoft Windows and Linux. A wide
spectrum of operating system versions were installed.
Active Directory services were installed on a
Windows Server 2016 Enterprise system to emulate a
typical corporate controlled authentication system. A
DNS was also installed to provide name services for all
of the clients and servers in the network. There were
also a number of other common services provided on
the network such as web servers, database servers, file
servers, etc. A total of 50 systems were installed in
the environment with an even split of 25 each for each
operating system–Windows and Linux. Twelve of the 50
were servers (6 Windows servers and 6 Linux servers).
In the cyber deception conditions (C1, D1, and A2),
there were 50 decoys in addition to these systems.
A Network Time Protocol (NTP) server was
configured and installed within each participant’s
environment to provide time synchronization of all of
the machines, allowing for reliable timestamping for
data collection. The NTP server was designated as
out of scope for the participants since this was part
of the experimental support infrastructure and would
jeopardize the data collection effort if attacked.
To provide a more realistic environment, 130 domain
user accounts were created to provide a lived-in network
appearance for the participants. Of the 130 domain
user accounts, there were 15 domain administrators
to simulate the IT staff for the fictional organization.
Separate OUs (Organizational Units) were created to
simulate actual business organizations (i.e. IT, Sales,
HR, Staff) since it is common to create OUs to mirror
primary business functions. A number of files were
also created and placed in the user accounts and log
files were populated by having staff members perform
activity on the network during the creation phase.
For example, several domain administrator accounts
were selected and used during this phase to generate
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Two Days of Scenario-Based Penetration Testing
Day 1 Conditions
(between participants)
Participants Split into
Four Groups: A-D

A1
B1
C1
D1

No decoys; Not Informed ("Control")
No decoys; Informed ("Psychological")
Decoys present; Not Informed ("Cyber Unaware")
Decoys present; Informed ("Cyber Aware")

Day 2 Conditions
( within participants; changes from Day 1 in bold)
A2
B2
C2
D2

DECOYS ADDED; Still not informed
Still no decoys; NOT INFORMED
DECOYS REMOVED; Still not informed
DECOYS REMOVED, NOT INFORMED

Comparisons Between Groups: Day 1
• A vs B: Whether information matters in the absence of

decoys
Planned Comparisons

• A vs C: Whether decoy presence matters in the absence of

information
• B vs D: Whether decoy presence matters when information

on deception is given
• C vs D: Whether information on deception matters when

decoys are present

Comparisons Within Group: Day 1 vs Day 2
• A1 vs A2: What happens when a decoy is added (without any other indication deception

techniques may be in play)?
• B1 vs B2: After being previously told deception techniques may be in play, do these

beliefs and behaviors persist when the warning is not given a second time?
• C1 vs C2: Does the effect of the decoys disappear when the decoys are no longer present,

or does it persist without any indication deception techniques may be in play?
• D1 vs D2: Does the effect of the decoys disappear when the decoys are no longer

present, and when indications of deception techniques are no longer given?

Figure 1. Experimental conditions. Each day, a decoy system was either present or absent on the network and
participants were either informed or not informed that cyber deception tools might be present on the network.

log activity that would appear to be authentic. Each
domain user account had a password that met the
minimum-security requirements. Each Windows system
was then joined to the domain to allow authentication
services to work properly within the network. The IP
addresses were randomized within a typical Class C
subnet and MAC addresses were generated to represent
typical vendor (i.e. Dell, HP, Intel, etc).
The decoys used as the cyber deception component
in this experiment were based on lightweight
virtualization and were configured to replicate operating
system and services of typical assets residing in an
enterprise network. The decoys were configured to
mimic both Linux and Windows services similar to
those in the Cyber Range. These decoys respond to
typical network port scans and provide almost identical
feedback to those of real desktops. Since actual services
were not running on these decoys, any attempt by a
subject to logon failed and was logged as an indicator of
unauthorized activity. Examples of some of the services
are Apache web server, DNS, SSH, and FTP. Separate
environments were designed to facilitate experimental
conditions with and without decoys. With exception of
the presence or absence of decoys, the environments
were designed to be as similar as possible to allow for
easy comparative performance analysis.
Each subject was provided with a laptop to use
during the experiment that was connected to the cyber
range via a dedicated network. These laptops were
configured with Kali Linux which provides a robust
environment for penetration testers with over 600
security-related tools. Some of the most commonly
used tools in this distribution are Nmap (port scanner),
Metasploit Framework (penetration testing), and ZAP
web application security scanner. In addition, the laptops
were configured with their own offline Kali Linux
repository with 65 Gigabytes (GB) of binary packages
that include additional tools and software that could be
easily installed by the subjects. The use of the offline
repository enabled us to disconnect the laptops from
the internet (ensuring no PII was accidentally collected)

while still enabling the subject to install additional
software if needed throughout the study.
Cyber Data. We collected several data sources from
the participants’ attack clients during the study. Netflow
and tcpdump recorded full packet capture from their
machines for post-experiment review of their network
activity. A keylogger and video screen capture were
used for the duration of the experiment to record their
host-based operations. Participants were encouraged to
keep a running log of findings via a Mattermost chat
client during the experiment, giving real-time insight
into what parts of their activities they thought were
notable as they experienced them. Additionally, we
retrieved data from the participants’ laptops after the
experiment was over. Several logs from the Kali Linux
operating system were collected, including logs of
the processes run, the system notifications, daemon
logs, authentication records, and default package logs.
The shells used by the participants had their history
aggregated to reveal commands entered. All notes stored
by the participants on the attack client were collected as
well. If deception was present in their environment, we
also collected the logs server-side from the decoy system
that tracked instances of the decoys being triggered.
These logs tracked four primary interactions with the
decoys: single packets to a single host (touch), multiple
packets to a single host (probe), single packets to
multiple hosts in succession (scan), and interactive login
attempts (intrusion).

3.2.

Individual Measures

In addition to the network penetration task,
participants completed a series of questionnaires and
cognitive tasks. This section highlights the tasks selected
and justification for their inclusion. See supplemental
materials in the online appendices1 for more details
including the cyber task instructions (Appendix B), full
schedule (Appendix C), and all questionnaires.
Task-Specific Questions. Three sets of questions
1 https://cfwebprod.sandia.gov/cfdocs/CompResearch/docs/
TularosaAppendix.pdf
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were designed to measure participants’ experiences
during the experiment. The questions provided a
data stream on task performance in addition to data
collected directly during the network penetration task.
These questions included a daily briefing consisting of
open-ended questions about participants’ experiences
during the network penetration test, with participants
in the informed condition explicitly asked about “the
nature of deception on the network, if found” (Appendix
A.1). On Day 2 participants were asked about their
experience across both days and to rate tools available
to them and their prior knowledge (Appendix A.2).
In addition, each day participants were given a Cyber
Task Questionnaire (CTQ, Appendix A.3) in which they
were asked to rate and explain the level of confusion,
self-doubt, confidence, surprise, and frustration they
felt during the cyber exercise, with the Day 2 version
including a question about belief in the presence of
deception on the network.
General Questions about the Individual. These
questions were designed to measure general information
about an individual such as their demographic
information (Appendix A.4) and cyber security
experience (Appendix A.5). These items are of
particular interest because they may help diagnose
whether given effects found in the data set are due to the
experimental manipulation or a particular individual’s
background (even given random assignment to
condition). They could also help explain the factors
relevant to particular performance characteristics (e.g.,
initial moves of a participant with over twenty years of
experience versus two years of experience). We also
asked participants who experienced cyber deception
to complete a questionnaire designed to assess their
responses to deception in a network penetration context.
Cognitive Battery. General cognitive ability
(i.e., I.Q.) is traditionally the best predictor of
individual job performance across job categories
and situations [16, 17]. Measurement of additional,
specific cognitive abilities may provide additional
predictive value in the context of particular jobs,
reflecting the specific processing required in these
domains. This includes circumstances in which initial
selection on general cognitive ability already occurs
as part of an employment screening process [18].
Furthermore, non-cognitive attributes (e.g., personality
characteristics) may provide additional predictive
power [19]. Therefore, the battery for this study
includes a number of tasks and questionnaires that go
beyond general cognitive ability in order to allow a
more comprehensive understanding of the abilities and
attributes that are thought to characterize red teamers or
be predictive of performance in the domain of network
penetration (e.g, [4, 20, 3]).
Cognitive tasks included the Shipley-2 [21] as
a measure of overall cognitive ability, the Sandia

Progressive Matrices (SPM; [22]) as a measure of
fluid intelligence (i.e., those aspects of intelligence that
allow for adaptive reasoning and problem solving),
the Over-Claiming Questionnaire (OCQ; [23]) as a
measure of ability to distinguish real from fictional
items and decision-making confidence, the Operation
Span (O-Span; [24]) task as a measure of working
memory (i.e., ability to maintain information in memory
and inhibit distractors), the Remote Associates Task
(RAT; [25]) as a measure of convergent creative
thinking (i.e., generating atypical links between
concepts in order to generate a solution to a problem),
and a set of insight and analytical problems to solve
[26] in order to assess proficiency at generating
incremental solutions (analytical problems) and at
reframing problems and approaching them from
different perspectives (insight problems). Personality
assessments included the Big Five Inventory (BFI;
[27]) as a measure of openness to experience,
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and
neuroticism, the General Decision-Making Style
Inventory (GDMSI; [28]) as an indicator of the way
in which individuals approach and make decisions, the
Indecisiveness Scale (IS; [29]) in order to determine
if participants tend toward intuitive speeded decisions
or toward gathering as much information as possible,
and the Need for Cognition (NfC; [30]) as measure of
individuals’ tendencies to pursue and enjoy the process
of thinking.
Participants were also given the Karolinska Sleep
Diary (KSD; [31]) to assess sleep quality for the
night prior to administration, as some participants were
required to travel prior to participation and may have
experienced sleep disturbances which could impact task
performance.
Physiological. Physiological data was collected
using Empatica E4 wrist-based devices. The Empatica
E4 collects heart rate information (including heart
rate variability via blood volume pulse), motion-based
activity (accelerometer), peripheral skin temperature
(infrared thermopile), and galvanic skin response
(electrodermal activity sensor). Physiological signals
like these have been used to characterize and predict
cognitive and physical states in a variety of settings.

4.

Implementation

The experimental design received approval from
each of the authors’ institutional ethics review boards.
No personal identifying information (PII) was collected
and all experimental data was anonymized with subject
IDs. No cyber task performance or HSR information
will be provided back to any participants’ employers.

4.1.

Participants

Prior to traveling to our site for the two-day
study, participants were provided the statement of
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work which indicated that they would be participating
in a series of capture the flag style events to
measure the effectiveness of defensive software on
a simulated network. Participants could request, in
advance, software tools, reference information (e.g.,
technical documents), and other computer files they
wished to be included for the event. This ensured
participants would have access to preferred tools and
that all participants had access to the same tools. They
were aware their actions would be monitored during the
task and that they would be asked to complete a series of
reports and questionnaires. Finally, they were informed
that they would be required to sign a nondisclosure
agreement stating they would not reveal information
about the task, the network vulnerabilities, and the
defenses encountered (including to other participants).
Upon arriving to the study, participants were asked
whether they would also like to be part of a human
subjects research study (HSR) as part of the cyber
exercise. Those who opted in provided physiological
and cognitive data in addition to the network penetration
task and task-specific questionnaires; they were offered
a $25 Amazon gift card for their participation. Six
participants did not volunteer for the HSR portion.
Those who opted out wrote an extended red team report,
such that participants spent the same amount of time in
the study regardless of the decision they made.

4.2.

Procedure

The study took place over two consecutive days with
up to ten participants per session. Each participant was
assigned to an individual work station in the same room
but divided into private, cubicle-style spaces. A proctor
was always present in the room to answer questions and
ensure participants worked independently. We attempted
to group similar conditions (e.g., informed) during
sessions to minimize cross-contamination. Participants
worked on the same network environment within a given
day (e.g., morning and afternoon on Day 1) but a new
variation of the environment across days (e.g., Day 1 vs.
Day 2). They were given an attack laptop for the network
penetration task and an additional laptop with internet
connectivity for research and the cognitive battery. The
items in the cognitive battery were either completed with
printouts or using E-Prime 3.0 software.

5.

Sample Population Characteristics

Data was collected on 132 professional red teamers,
126 of whom agreed to participate in the HSR portion
of the study. This section summarizes their responses
to questions in the individual measures relevant to
characterizing the sample population. The vast majority
of our participants were male with English as their
primary language. Most were under 35 years old and had
a bachelor’s degree as their highest level of education.
Responses on the experience questionnaire indicated

that participants were fairly evenly split between Linux
and Windows users, although some chose to write-in
Mac or a combination of operating systems. Most
tended to work in groups of two to three people for
engagements that last one to two weeks. However,
there was substantial variance in these responses. The
participants indicated the highest level of their expertise
and years of experience in cyber security, network
reconnaissance, and generalized defense practice. This
is the skill set most necessary for the cyber task
presented in the Tularosa study.

6.

Results

While the primary purpose of this paper is to
describe the detailed methodology and data collected for
the Tularosa experiment, we provide preliminary results
addressing the cognitive battery, personality assessment,
and cyber task questionnaire. These begin to address
the first of the set of hypothesis around which the
experiment was designed, as well as the validity of the
experiment and the participant population.

6.1.

Cognitive Battery/Personality Assessment

Following the cyber task on each day, participants
completed a number of cognitive tasks and personality
assessments. This battery was designed to characterize
red teamers and to provide measurements of cognitive
abilities and personality attributes previously
hypothesized to be predictive of performance in
this domain (e.g., [4, 20]). See Figure 2 for details of
all significant effects from the comparative analyses.
Scores from the current work were compared against
other data sets to determine how red teamers as a
specialized population may differ from more general
populations (e.g., college undergraduates). Means and
standard deviations from our sample and comparison
samples were calculated, as were mean difference
scores, and an effect size (Cohen’s d). Independent
samples two-tailed t-tests were conducted to assess
any statistical differences between groups. Assumptions
of normality were not violated, however Welch’s
correction for unequal variances was applied since the
sample sizes were often very different between groups.
For the GDMSI and NfC, our data was compared
against that of 1,919 U.S. adults recruited via Amazon
Mechanical Turk to assess attitudes toward privacy and
security in the cyber domain [20]. Results suggest that
for the rational subscale of the GDMSI, our sample
displays a more rational decision making style relative
to the comparison sample. For the avoidant subscale
of the GDMSI, our sample shows a less avoidant
style. These results indicate that network penetration
professionals approach decision-making scenarios with
a relatively high emphasis on a thorough search for
and evaluation of alternative approaches while avoiding
postponement of decision execution. An analytical
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Figure 2. Comparative Analyses: Statistics for responses on cognitive tasks and questionnaires.

and decisive approach has been suggested in prior
characterizations of this group [4]. Results for the NfC
scale suggest that our sample exhibits a higher need for
cognition than the comparison sample, indicating that
red teamers have a greater tendency than the comparison
sample to pursue difficult problems and to enjoy the
process of thinking, which is consistent with what prior
interviews have implied [3].
For the IS, our participant results were compared
against those from 291 undergraduate students [29].
Results suggest that our sample is less indecisive. These
findings support the GDMSI result of a less avoidant
style of decision making and are consistent with the
notion that network penetration professionals tend to be
decisive when presented with decision situations.
Our BFI was compared against a dataset [32]
of 132,515 internet users living in the United
States and Canada, aged 21-60. The sample of
network penetration professionals exhibited higher
scores on Agreeableness (predilection toward trust and
compliance), Conscientiousness (level of efficiency and
organization), and and lower scores on Neuroticism
(an irritable, unhappy disposition), relative to the
comparison dataset.
Our scores on the SPM were compared against a
sample of 171 undergraduate students for the Day 1
session and a subset of 160 undergraduate students
for the Day 2 session [33], matching groups who
answered the same subset of problems. Our scores on
the O-Span were compared against that of 6,236 college
students [34]. No significant effects were observed in
either case.
For the Insight and Analytical Problem Solving task
and the RAT, the average solution rates (and reaction
time for the RAT) were calculated based on the data
of college students (see [26] for the Problem Solving
Task; see [35] for the RAT) for the subset of problems
we used. Standard deviations were not reported for the
solution rates, so the only statistical comparison that
could be attempted was on the RAT reaction time to
produce correct solutions, which yielded a small effect
where the Tularosa sample was faster.

6.2.

Cyber Task Questionnaire

The primary research question that we begin to
address with the Cyber Task Questionnaire (CTQ)
involves the participants belief in deception given the
manipulated two independent variables: Presence of
cyber deception (absent vs. present) and Information
about deception (uninformed vs. informed).
Responses to the belief in deception item (Appendix
A.3) were coded using a scale from 1 = definitely
no deception to 5 = definitely deception. Two raters
completed the scoring, and scores were averaged
across raters for analysis. Inter-rater reliability
showed satisfactory reliability for Day 1 ratings
(83% agreement, Cohen’s κ = .77). At the end of each
day, participants also reported the extent to which they
felt confused, self-doubt, confident, surprised, and
frustrated with the task on scales from 1 to 5.
Between-Group Differences on Day 1. We
consider between-group differences on Day 1 to answer
the research questions introduced in Figure 1 as Planned
Comparisons Between Groups. A 2 (Cyber Deception
Presence: absent vs. present) x 2 (Information:
uninformed vs. informed) between-subjects ANOVA
showed that there was a main effect for Presence,
F (1, 61) = 12.36, p < .001, where those in the
Present conditions reported more significantly belief in
deception compared (M = 3.60) to Absent (M =
2.19), p < .001. There was also a nonsignificant
trend for information, such that those informed about
deception tended to suspect more deception (M = 3.21)
compared to those uninformed (M = 2.58), p = .125.
See Figure 3 for comparisons between each of the four
experimental conditions.
Correlations between variables on Day 1 also
provide interesting indications of different cognitive
effects across conditions that mirror examples
documented in the pilot studies. The non-deceptive
conditions showed significant positive correlations
between reporting frustration and confusion (r = .574,
p < 0.001 for Control (A1) and r = .454, p < 0.05 for
Cyber Aware (D1)). This could indicate that the task
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Figure 3. Day 1 between-group differences in belief
of deception. Results suggest a cumulative effect of
information and presence, such that veridical
information in the presence of cyber deception instills
the greatest belief in the presence of deception.

itself had confusing aspects which led to frustration
among participants. Both Informed conditions showed
significant positive correlations between reporting
frustration and self-doubt (r = .391, p < 0.05 for
present and r = .583, p < 0.01 for absent), and
negative correlations between self-doubt and confidence
(r = −.536, p < 0.01 and r = −.511, p < 0.01
respectively). This may indicate that information of the
presence of deception (regardless of the veracity of the
statement) can cause self-doubt to the participant, which
affects confidence. Both Present conditions showed
significant positive correlations between reporting
frustration and surprise (r = .563, p < 0.01 for
uninformed and r = .708, p < 0.001 for informed), as
well as self-doubt and confusion (r = .535, p < 0.01
for uninformed and r = .381, p < 0.05 for informed),
indicating that cyber deception may cause a cyber
attacker surprise, and confusion about the network may
lead to increased self-doubt when attacking. In the
Cyber Unaware condition (C1), suspicion of deception
was negatively correlated with self-doubt (r = −.535,
p < 0.05), mirroring what was discovered in the pilot
studies [11]; participants could be attributing task
performance to feelings of inadequacy instead of to
deception deployed on the network. However, in the
Cyber Aware condition (D1), a positive correlation
was observed with confidence (r = .490, p < 0.05),
which could be reflecting the fact that since they were
informed, and likely found deception evident on the
network, they felt confident in their ability to negotiate
it. In fact, an opposite, though marginal, effect was
observed in the absent-informed condition, suggesting
that being informed about deception but not finding
anything on the network to support that claim resulted
in less confidence about the attack strategy.
The CTQ data is a small portion of the data
available for analysis. These answers were collected at
the end of each day and required participants to think
back and remember how they felt during the task and

are only as reliable as the participants’ memory and
self-judgment. Self-reported thoughts and feelings often
produce small effects, requiring greater sample sizes to
detect significant differences between groups.
Next steps for this analysis would be to supplement
these findings with participants’ qualitative reports on
their thoughts, feelings, and strategies used. Analyzing
the daily briefings and Mattermost text will enhance the
current data by providing a more coherent picture about
how subjects experienced deception (and lack thereof).
In addition, the emotional measures included in this
data (e.g., frustration, surprise) should be compared to
subjects’ physiological responses. Finally, this data can
be used to identify participants who felt highly confident
in their performance, which will allow us to compare
their actual success (as described in Section 8) with their
perceived success.
Overall, employing real deception may evoke more
frustration and suspicion regardless of whether attackers
are told about the deception or not. Additionally, these
data suggest that merely telling attackers that there may
be deception can cause them to be more suspicious
and more surprised about the network, possibly slowing
them down or motivating them to change their strategy.
Notably, the largest between-group disparity in many
calculations was between the Control (A1) and the
Cyber Aware (D1). This is particularly noteworthy
because it may begin to counter popular opinion that
cyber deception techniques are only/more effective if the
attacker is unaware of its presence.

7.

Discussion

While there are cyber games and Capture the Flag
(CTF) activities that occur every year, we believe this
is the largest controlled experiment which held constant
the tools and exploits available to the attacker, the
network topology and vulnerabilities, and the time
participants had to launch attacks. In addition, the
amount and variation of data collected is unprecedented
(74 GB of data, plus an additional 1537 GB of screen
capture video).

7.1.

Design Decisions

Ferguson-Walter, Lafon, and Shade began to
examine the effectiveness of decoys used for cyber
defense with the pilot studies described in [11]. The
results of those studies indicated that cyber deception
had a measurable impact on attacker performance, with
more time spent on decoys than real machines and
self-reported confusion of which were the decoys. They
also investigated whether just the belief that deception
is in use can negatively affect attacks. We built upon the
results of those pilot studies. Many of the aspects of the
experiment were kept the same, but key changes were
made to ensure a more rigorous experimental design.
Other aspects were changed due to necessity rather than
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a focused improvement to the methodology; we discuss
some trade-offs below.
Notably there were some calculated trade-offs in the
design decisions for the Tularosa study that are less
realistic than the pilot studies, the first being that the
red teamers were asked to work independently. We opted
for a larger sample size, trading off a degree of realism
for those used to working as part of a team. For some
participants, this may have hampered their performance;
however, it was a restriction that was distributed across
all participants and could even mimic a team that trades
off roles across different tasks or days.
While originally framed as a CTF event, we decided
not to include literal flags for the participants to collect
along the way. We felt this could produce the wrong
kind of motivation and could potentially be used as a
“tell” that could disclose the deception in an unintended
way. We investigated the use of “false flags” to be
used as part of the deception but had concerns about
biasing the results of the study by unfairly rewarding
participants for interacting with the decoys. We did not
use flags, believing this increased realism and reduced
the chances of incorporating extra bias in the results.
However, the lack of flags makes the data coding more
complicated (as described in Section 8). It also caused
some confusion amongst participants who had no clear
metric to know when they were done with the cyber task.
However, with only one day provided for each network,
there was no concern that the participants would run out
of things to investigate.
The next trade-off stems from having a large
sample size in this study. While the Tularosa study
generally collected vastly more data, the pilot studies
did have trained observers in the room, encouraging
participants to think aloud during the task. This enabled
audio recording (and eventually text transcription
with easy access to time stamps) to correlate verbal
comments expressing frustration or confusion back
to the computer interaction at that time. This gave
the research team the ability to ask for clarification
and also directly link the commands attempted and
interactions with certain machines with psychological
attributes of the participant. While this was a major
strength of the pilot studies, it simply was not
scalable. Additionally, with each participant working
individually, we deliberately tried to minimize any
verbal discussion or questions during the study that
could influence another individual’s thoughts or actions.
We had a proctor in the room at all times, noting
any blatant signs of frustration and noting the time.
Additionally we had a Red Team Report at the end of
each day. In order to try to get similar information that
can be more easily correlated with the time stamps of the
participant interactions during the cyber task, we asked
participants to use the chat client to document their plans
and progress, in real-time, during the task. There was a

wide variance in how people used this tool and how well
people followed instructions in general.
A trade-off that has potential effects on the
generalization of the results is that the cyber task
ran on a fully simulated network designed just for
this study. There were no real users. There was no
unexplained messiness or policies not being followed
unless designed by us. This is clearly not realistic and
may reduce the measured effectiveness, especially of the
psychological deception, where pilot studies suggest the
effects of being informed of deception benefit from the
natural messiness present in an enterprise network.

7.2.

Experimental Validity and Limitations

Validity concerns, including internal, external, and
construct validity were considered when designing the
Tularosa study. Internal validity was supported by using
the same proctors throughout the experiment who read
from a standardized script for instructions and responses
to participant questions. Participant time on task was
cataloged and monitored throughout the session, as
were breaks, and lunch. Duration of the cyber task was
controlled, as was the lunch break, for all participants.
Participants were not allowed to discuss the cyber
task during breaks. Identical copies of the cyber range
were presented to all participants for a given condition,
and identical machines (Kali Linux and internet-ready
reference laptops). We arranged ahead of time to include
any publicly available tools requested by participants,
however no proprietary or costly tools were allowed.
Additionally, a large standard set of red teaming tools
were provided. A within subjects’ component was
implemented, whereby only cyber range deception was
manipulated on Day 2. This design choice reduced
the amount of individual variability across days and
conditions inherent in between subjects’ designs.
Many aspects of the Tularosa design support external
validity. Since this was a tightly controlled laboratory
study, the ecological validity could be called into
question. For example, the standard set of tools provided
could have hampered the performance of participants
who were out of their comfort zones and unable to
rely on tools they regularly use. As a proxy for one
aspect of ecological validity, we asked participants to
rate on a scale of 1-5 how they felt regarding the tools
provided to them during the experiment (Appendix A.2).
The mean rating was 3.51 out of 5, with a standard
deviation of 0.93, suggesting that participants were
largely satisfied with the tool selection provided to them.
Participants were provided with a popular red teaming
platform, Kali Linux, as well as internet access on
a separate laptop for research. This experiment was
designed to test the behavior of red teamers, and how
this study would generalize to other populations who
perform cyber attacks is unknown at this time. We
subcontracted participants through various companies
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in several states around the United States, thus giving
this project a broad, random sample within the specific
population of professional red teamers. That said, this
experiment was not an “in the wild” red teaming
exercise, and thus proprietary tools were not allowed,
participants had to work alone rather than in groups,
and had a tightly controlled schedule. Finally, real-world
cyber attack scenarios and ted teaming engagements
typically exceed one day. Moreover, often the attacker
will be the deciding factor of how long the engagement
continues, which could change dynamically based on
many relevant factors including interest, difficulty, and
priority. We only allowed the participants to perform
the task for one day per network. This was a monetary
necessity but does diverge from the usual experience as
evident in the data collected from the participants on the
usual duration of engagements.
Construct validity is difficult to measure currently,
as many planned future analyses will be required
to determine if the deception led to altered
cyber-behavioral performance. However, results
discussed in Section 6.2 on self-reported suspicion of
deception by condition did reveal associations between
the cyber deception manipulation and suspicion. The
data suggest an aggregate effect of the two deception
manipulations, as the Cyber Aware condition showed
the largest suspicion scores, whereas the Cyber Unaware
condition produced an effect of roughly 80 percent that
of the Cyber Aware condition. These data need to be
scrutinized more carefully to disentangle the specific
contributions of each of the deception manipulations.

8.

Future Work

This paper described the experimental methodology
and data collected in the Tularosa experiment.
We presented some preliminary results, but many
hypotheses posed still remain. These results will be
presented in future publications. Future analysis will
address the following hypotheses:
• Defensive (cyber and psychological) deception
tools impede attackers who seek to penetrate
computer systems and infiltrate information.
• Defensive cyber deception tools are effective even
if an attacker is aware of their use.
• Defensive deception is effective if attackers
believe it may be in use, even when it is not.
• Defensive (cyber and psychological) deception
causes an attacker increased cognitive load.
• There is an observable correlation between cyber
deception and physiological measures.
Performance measurement is key to addressing
these hypotheses and there can be multiple (sometimes
competing) indicators of success or failure for the cyber
task. Future work includes evaluating vulnerabilities
correctly identified and exploited (assessing both

quantity and speed), as well as any mismatch between
reported/perceived success and measured success. We
will also calculate time until detection and time spent
attacking each host (to assess time wasted on decoys).
In addition to the preliminary results presented
in this paper, we will evaluate the cognitive and
physiological data to identify signs of increased
stress, cognitive load, or changes in emotional state.
Ultimately, we will investigate whether increased
confusion and frustration is correlated with lower
performance in a network penetration task.

9.

Conclusions

Cyber deception has been described as a “game
changer” in cyber security–one that can allow the
cyber defender to leverage the “home-field advantage”
of owning and controlling the targeted network
environment. The Tularosa study was designed to
empirically measure the effectiveness of cyber (and
psychological) deception on an attacker’s ability
to perform reconnaissance and exploitation. While
this initial paper describes the experimental design,
methodology, cyber range, participant population, and
data collected, it only begins to address a subset of the
research questions which motivated the work. Future
publications will provide results addressing these main
hypotheses.
The scale and breadth of data collected in this
controlled study will allow for further future analyses
beyond those described in this paper. Furthermore, there
are many cyber defense research questions beyond the
effectiveness of cyber deception that this data can help
address.
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